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Why did Kant conclude 
the Critique of Pure Reason 
with "the history of pure reason"? 
 
Zeyad El Nabolsy, McMaster University, Ontario 
 
n this paper I examine Kant's conception of the history of 
pure reason and its relation to his metaphilosophy as it is 
presented in the Critique of Pure Reason [Kritik der reinen 
Vernunft] (KrV). In particular, I will attempt to answer the 
following question: why did Kant conclude the KrV with the 
history of pure reason and why did he insist that, without it, a 
gap would remain in his system? In the course of attempting to 
answer this question, I will argue that Kant chose to conclude 
the KrV with a sketch of the history of pure reason because he 
took his ability to provide the history of pure reason to be a 
mark of the adequacy and success of his own philosophical 
system, in so far as it is the system which comprehends the 
nature of human reason, specifically the teleological nature of 
human reason (i.e., the system that recognizes that reason has 
intrinsic, self-imposed interests and goals) and insofar as it is the 
only system which, as the culmination of all the past systems of 
philosophy, is in a position to identify and satisfy all of the 
interests of human reason.  
 
1. Introductory overview of the main argument 
 
irst, it is important to note that Kant thought that the 
history of pure reason was not extraneous to his own 
system. He begins the chapter titled "The history of pure 
reason" by asserting that "this title stands here only to designate 
a place that is left open in the system and must be filled in the 
I 
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future" [my emphasis] (B 880).1 Here, we have an explicit 
statement to the effect that the history of pure reason is a part of 
Kant's philosophical system and that, without it, his philo-
sophical system would be incomplete. Moreover, Kant identi-
fies the history of pure reason, as part of the transcendental 
doctrine of method, with the "determination of the formal 
conditions of a complete system of pure reason" (B 736). The 
importance of the history of pure reason for Kant's system 
should be understood in relation to the central aim of the KrV. 
According to Kant, the task which reason takes on in the KrV is 
"the most difficult of all its tasks, namely, that of self-
knowledge"(A xiii). If, as Kant claims, reason does have a 
history,2 then a key component of reason's self-knowledge 
would be knowledge of the history of its unfolding and self-
articulation (based on the critical philosophy's comprehension 
of reason's teleological structure). Hence, in so far as the critical 
philosophy aims at providing reason with self-knowledge, the 
history of pure reason must be provided in order to attain this 
aim (i.e., reason's self-knowledge would be incomplete without 
the history of pure reason). The history of pure reason, in turn, 
requires (from Kant's perspective) the discoveries about the 
nature of human reason that Kant believed he had made.  
																																								 																				
1 I should note that while, strictly speaking, Kant takes the history of pure reason 
to be the history of metaphysics, I will be employing the term the 'history of pure 
reason' in order to refer to Kant's conception of the history of philosophy in 
general. The justification for this approach is fairly straightforward; Kant took 
metaphysics to be the core of philosophy (at least, historically speaking). Kant 
describes metaphysics as "a fundamental science" (B xxiv), hence (for Kant) the 
"general problem of pure reason", namely, how are synthetic a priori judgements 
possible? (B 19), is really a general problem for philosophy as such (i.e., 
philosophy in general inherits the problems of pure reason). In fact, in the Vienna 
Logic, Kant even claims that "only metaphysics is true philosophy" (Kant 1992, 
264). Hence, I take it that Kant's conception of "the history of pure reason" can be 
treated as being his conception of the history of philosophy in general (except for 
logic, since Kant notoriously claimed that logic has been complete, as a science, 
since Aristotle's time (B viii)).  
2 Textual evidence in support of this claim is provided below.  
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Given Kant's conception of a system as "the unity of the 
manifold cognitions under one idea" (B 860), it follows that the 
history of pure reason, if it is part of Kant's philosophical 
system, must exist in a non-accidental relation to the rest of 
Kant's philosophical system (i.e., it cannot be an extraneous 
"add-on", so it must be systematically and intrinsically con-
nected to the rest of Kant's philosophy, and it is the aim of this 
paper to discover the nature of this systemic connection). I also 
want to point out that to claim that the history of pure reason is a 
part of Kant's philosophical system is quite different from mak-
ing the much weaker claim that Kant thought that studying the 
history of philosophy was useful. I want to argue for the 
stronger claim, namely, that the history of pure reason is an 
integral component of Kant's philosophical system, and I think 
that the relevant textual evidence supports this claim.  
 
2. Kant's “proto-Hegelian” conception 
of the history of philosophy 
 
hat Kant does not conceive of the history of pure reason 
as being a scholarly account of past philosophical posi-
tions and systems is made evident by the manner in 
which he characterizes the standpoint from which the history of 
pure reason is to be narrated. That standpoint is characterized as 
the "transcendental point of view, namely that of the nature of 
pure reason" (B 880). This implies that the history of pure 
reason is to be narrated from the standpoint of the system that is 
able to understand the ends and interests of reason (this is what 
Kant means by "transcendental point of view" in this context).3 
																																								 																				
3 This standpoint is not identical to the complete system of pure reason, since Kant himself 
acknowledged that he had not managed to provide a complete articulation of pure reason, 
though he did think that he had shown the path that should be followed in order to arrive at 
such an articulation (see B 883). On one reading of Kant's project, the fully articulated system 
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This standpoint is the standpoint of the philosophical system 
which is able to comprehend the nature of pure reason. That the 
history of philosophy can only be adequately narrated from the 
standpoint which enables one to understand the nature of reason 
(including its ends and interests) is a claim that would not be 
endorsed by many (if any) historians of philosophy working 
today (hence, in this sense, Kant's conception of the history of 
pure reason is different from what we would call a scholarly 
history of philosophy). Moreover, it should be noted that when 
Kant speaks of the history of pure reason (or, alternatively, of a 
philosophical history of philosophy), he does not mean to refer 
to an empirical history at all (in fact, as we shall see below, 
Kant thought that a philosophical history of philosophy is 
indeed possible a priori). I will argue that Kant thought that the 
history of pure reason is not the history of contingent historical 
developments, and that he endorsed a proto-Hegelian concep-
tion of the history of philosophy, according to which the history 
of philosophy follows a necessary path culminating in the 
critical philosophy.4 To readers who are more familiar with a 
tamer version of Kant, this reading might appear baseless, or 
even a perverse attempt to Hegelianize Kant, but the relevant 
textual evidence clearly supports my claims. 
Here, I would like to very briefly point to some key elements 
of Hegel's conception of the history of philosophy and the role 
that the "idea", as an organizing principle, plays in it, so that the 
reader can have a determinate conception of what I mean when 
I say that Kant's conception of the history of pure reason is 
proto-Hegelian. In his introduction to the 1820 Lectures on the 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																	
of reason would require metaphysics to provide a moral plan for human culture (Velkley 
1989, 148). If this reading is correct, then the standpoint in question involves recognizing that 
this is the task of metaphysics and that the failure of all previous metaphysics is, in part, due 
to a misunderstanding of the proper task of metaphysics (the discovery of the end of reason 
and the systematization of culture using this end as the idea of such a system).  
4 I borrow the term 'proto-Hegelian' from Yirmiahu Yovel (1980).  
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History of Philosophy, Hegel makes the following claims: 1."I 
maintain that if the fundamental concepts appearing in the 
history of philosophy are treated purely as what they are in 
themselves discarding what affects their external form [....] then 
we have before us the different stages in the determination of 
the Idea itself in their logical order and essence" (Hegel 1985, 
22) 2."[…] it is only a history of philosophy set forth as such a 
system of the development of the Idea which deserves the name 
of a science, it is clear that a collection of facts does not 
constitute a science" (Hegel 1985, 23). I submit that these two 
claims would not be out of place in Kant's chapter on the 
architectonic in the KrV.  
Kant is clearly not interested in tracing the genealogy of 
concepts and the actual, historical connections between 
different philosophers and their ideas.5 What he is interested in, 
as he claims in his incomplete essay What real progress has 
metaphysics made in Germany since the time of Leibniz and 
Wolff ?, 6 is "a philosophical history of philosophy" which " is 
itself possible , not historically or empirically, but rationally, i.e., 
a priori. For although it establishes facts of reason, it does not 
borrow them from historical narrative, but draws them from the 
nature of human reason, as philosophical archaeology" (Kant 
2002, 417). Hence, in so far as Kant thinks that only his 
philosophy has been able to provide an adequate account of the 
																																								 																				
5 Karl Ameriks accurately describes the sketch that Kant provides in "the history of pure 
reason" as one that "remains dominated by abstract stereotypes rather than detailed 
engagements with particular writers" (Ameriks 2006, 11). However, Ameriks underplays 
Kant's developmental account of reason (see below). A.W. Moore, in turn, exemplifies the 
prevalent view of the last chapter of the KrV, i.e., he remarks in a few sentences that the 
"history of pure reason" contains Kant's "potted survey" of past philosophy and then moves 
on to discuss other things (Moore 2010, 320). This prevalent view, i.e., the view that there is 
little of importance in the last chapter of the KrV, is precisely what I want to challenge in this 
paper.  
6 As Henry Allison notes, the work that goes by this title is an incomplete draft of a response 
to a prize essay contest on this question that was announced in 1790. The incomplete draft 
was only published posthumously in 1804 (Kant 2002, 339). 
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nature of human reason, he would reject the possibility that 
such a history could be provided from the standpoint of a rival 
philosophical system (because if a rival system could provide a 
philosophical history of philosophy this would imply that the 
rival system in question also has an adequate account of the 
nature of human reason). It should also be noted that Kant 
makes it clear that a "philosophical history of philosophy" does 
not draw the series of events that it narrates from empirical 
history. However, it does not follow from this that Kant thinks 
that empirical history should not be done. It only follows that 
empirical history, on its own, does not attain the dignity of a 
"philosophical history of philosophy". For that (according to 
Kant), one would require knowledge of the nature of human 
reason. I should also add that while Kant does not explicitly 
discuss the relationship between the history of pure reason and 
the empirical history of philosophy in any great detail, it might 
be possible to extrapolate from his account in his Idea for a 
Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim. In that essay, Kant 
claims that it would be a mistake to think that he wants to 
replace empirical history with an a priori history (Kant 2007, 
119). A similar reading of the relationship between the history 
of pure reason (as narrated from the transcendental point of 
view) and the empirical history of pure reason is plausible. One 
way in which we can attempt to understand Kant's conception 
of the relationship between a philosophical history of philo-
sophy and the empirical history of philosophy is to think of the 
philosophical history of philosophy as providing a framework 
within which we can re-describe the empirical history of 
philosophy so that the latter can be seen as having a direction 
and a goal.7 In order to further elucidate this point we have to 
turn to Kant's understanding of the development of a science.  
																																								 																				
7 I am grateful to an anonymous referee at Kant Studies Online for pointing out the 
importance of emphasizing this relation.   
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3. Kant on the retrospective narration 
of the development of a science 
 
ant claims that we should understand the development 
of a science in terms of the development and actualiz-
ation of a potential idea, which "lies in reason like a 
seed" (B 862). 8 It is worth quoting the entire passage where this 
claim is made: 
 
Nobody attempts to establish a science without grounding 
it on an idea. But in its elaboration the schema, indeed 
even the definition of the science which is given right at 
the outset, seldom corresponds to the idea; for this lies in 
reason like a seed, all of whose parts still lie very involu-
ted and are hardly recognizable even under microscopic 
observation [my emphasis]. (B 862) 
 
First we must understand what Kant means by "idea" in this 
context. For Kant this is the organizing principle that allows for 
systematicity, he describes it as "the rational concept of the 
form of a whole, insofar as through this the domain of the 
manifold as well as the position of the parts with respect to each 
other is determined a priori" (B 861). The idea is what allows 
us to know when a system of knowledge is complete, because 
the place of all the elements that are supposed to be included in 
this system of knowledge is known a priori, and we can detect 
gaps by examining the knowledge that we already possess (B 
861). What is important here is that Kant is claiming that the 
development of a science (narrated retrospectively) can be 
understood in terms of the actualization of "the rational concept 
																																								 																				
8 And he must have considered philosophy in general and metaphysics in particular as well 
on their way to becoming sciences, if he believed that his philosophical system had achieved 
the standpoint from which a complete articulation of pure reason can be achieved.   
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of the form of a whole", and that in the initial stages of the 
development of a science, this idea (which is the organizing 
principle of that science) lies dormant as a potentiality in human 
reason. In other words, in the initial stages of the development 
of a science, there is a lack of correspondence between the 
unifying principle that the founders of that science employ (i.e., 
its schema) and the real (or true) unifying principle of that 
science (i.e., its idea).9  
I emphasize the aspect of retrospective narration because it is 
important to understand that, for Kant, the founders of a science 
can be accurately described as founders of a science only in 
retrospect, since they themselves would not have explicitly 
grasped the idea (i.e., "the rational concept of the form of a 
whole") which makes that science into the science that it is (i.e., 
a system of cognitions that involves "the division of the whole 
into members in conformity with the idea" (B 862)). Kant 
clearly makes this claim in the second half of the passage that 
has been quoted above: 
 
For this reason [the reason being the gap that exists 
between the schema that is used by the founders of a 
particular science and the implicit idea which determines 
that science's final, systematic configuration] sciences, 
since they have all been thought out from the viewpoint of 
a certain general interest, must not be explained and 
determined in accordance with the description given by 
																																								 																				
9 It should be noted that this brief discussion is clearly not meant to provide an exhaustive 
account of Kant's conception of science. I am only interested in discussing Kant's conception 
of science in so far as it provides an explanation for Kant's claims about the conditions that 
must obtain in order for the narration of the history of a science to be possible. Hence, I do 
not discuss many central features of Kant's conception of science, e.g., the notion of 
grounding, apodictic certainty, and the development of Kant's conception of systematicity. 
For a discussion of Kant's conception of grounding and apodictic certainty see (Van den Berg 
2011). For a discussion of the development of Kant's conception of systematicity see (Guyer 
2005, 11-37, 56-73).  
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their founder, but rather in accordance with the idea, 
grounded in reason itself, of the natural unity of the parts 
that have been brought together" (B 862).10 
 
We can clearly see that Kant thinks that the history of a science 
such as the history of pure reason, in so far as it presupposes 
that one has grasped the idea that makes that science into the 
science that it is, can only be narrated from the standpoint of 
success (after all, the very appellation "science" is a success 
term). In the case of the history of pure reason, the standpoint of 
success is the standpoint of the critical philosophy, which 
constitutes the necessary condition for the complete articulation 
of pure reason. It is important to note that this standpoint, which 
is "that of the nature of pure reason" (B 880), is not to be 
identified with the fully articulated system of pure reason, 
though it is a necessary condition for it.11 Kant alludes to this 
characterization of the standpoint from which the history of 
pure reason is to be narrated when he states in the concluding 
paragraph of "the history of pure reason" (which is also the 
concluding paragraph of the KrV as a whole) that "the critical 
path alone is still open" and that it will accomplish in less than 
two decades what has not be accomplished over many centuries 
(B 883).12  
																																								 																				
10 As Yovel has noted, it is the very finitude of human reason that accounts for this gap 
between the actual and the potential (Yovel 1980, 14).  
11 This important point was brought to my attention by an anonymous referee at Kant Studies 
Online. 
12 The implication being that this standpoint does not yet amount to a fully articulated system 
of reason (in relation to this point, there is a significant difference between Kant and Hegel). 
In this sense, I agree with Peter Gilgen's reading of this line (Gilgen 2009, 168-169).   
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4. Kant's teleological conception of reason 
and the narrative of the history of pure reason 
 
hat Kant thinks that we can only have a retrospective 
understanding of the progress of a science (i.e., of its 
development qua organized system of cognitions and 
not just as a set of unconnected cognitions that have as their 
object the same subject matter) is also evident from the fact that 
he explicitly states that "it is too bad that it is first possible for us 
to glimpse the idea in a clearer light and to outline a whole 
architectonically, in accordance with the ends of reason, only 
after we have long collected relevant cognitions haphazardly 
like building materials" (B 863). Note the emphasis on the 
unsystematic collection of cognitions and how these can only 
be arranged into a systemic whole (i.e., a science) by someone 
who has grasped the idea, which Kant equates with "the ends of 
reason". Also note how this fits in with his description of the 
standpoint from which the history of pure reason is to be 
narrated as "that of the nature of pure reason" (B 880). It is quite 
plausible to claim that, for Kant, a standpoint, which compre-
hends the nature of pure reason is one which also comprehends 
the ends of reason. After all, if human reason is essentially 
teleogical (or goal-oriented) in nature, a claim that Kant seems 
to be committed to in the passage that has been quoted above, it 
follows that a standpoint that comprehends the nature of pure 
reason must also comprehend the teleological nature of reason 
and the specific ends or goals that human reason sets for itself.13 
I say the goals that human reason sets for itself because Kant's 
commitment to autonomy and his rejection of heteronomy 
																																								 																				
13 In emphasizing the importance of Kant's teleological conception of reason (and its 
importance for his conception of the history of philosophy), I am in	 agreement with Paul	
Guyer's claim that teleology was central to Kant's metaphilosophy and to his conception of 
history (Guyer 2009).  
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(which is not just restricted to his moral philosophy) also 
commits him to the rejection of ready-made or externally 
imposed goals and rules for human reason (A xii).14 Hence, if 
being able to adopt the standpoint from which one can articulate 
the nature of pure reason (including its ends) is a necessary 
condition for being able to provide the narrative of the history of 
pure reason, then we can come to understand why Kant chose 
to conclude the KrV with a sketch of the history of pure reason, 
a sketch which is only a place holder for a fully worked out 
history of pure reason. He chose to do so because being able to 
provide this narrative (or at least the plan for it) is a mark of the 
success of his project, it implies (from Kant's own perspective) 
that he has fully understood the nature of human reason (which 
is what a critique of pure reason aims to do), and it implies that 
he has brought the history of philosophy to an end, in so far as 
his system provides the standpoint from which philosophy can 
finally be made into a science.15 
At this point, the reader might ask for a more sustained 
account of what the history of pure reason would have looked 
like if Kant had completed it (which he never did). This is a 
legitimate demand, and we can turn once more to the chapter on 
the architectonic in order to answer it. I will quote a rather long 
passage in full because I think that this passage is perhaps the 
most important passage in the KrV for understanding Kant's 
conception of the history of pure reason: 
 
																																								 																				
14 As Yovel points out, for Kant, "human reason must abide only by those universal rules it 
sets up for itself, and in which it can recognize the explication of its own subjective structure" 
(Yovel 1980, 13).  
15 In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant acknowledges that "it sounds arrogant, conceited, and 
belittling of those who have not yet renounced their old system to assert that before the 
coming of the critical philosophy there was as yet no philosophy at all [as a science]", 
however, he goes on to say that because "there can only be one human reason", there can 
only be one true system of philosophy. Hence, the other systems of philosophy are valuable 
only in proportion to their "contribution to present-day philosophy [i.e., the critical philo-
sophy]" (Kant 1991, 36).  
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The systems seem to have been formed, like maggots, by 
a generatio aequivoca [spontaneous generation] from the 
mere confluence of aggregated concepts, garbled at first 
but complete in time, although they all had their schema, 
as the original seed, in the mere self-development of 
reason, and on that account are not merely each articulated 
for themselves in accordance with an idea but are rather 
all in turn purposively united with each other as members 
of a whole in a system of human cognition, and allow an 
architectonic to all human knowledge. (B 863) 
 
Here, Kant is speaking of the different systems of philosophy 
that have emerged over time and their relation to his own 
system (i.e., the system that will allow for "an architectonic to 
all human knowledge"). What is especially interesting in this 
passage is that Kant seems to be claiming that an adequate 
comprehension and presentation of the development of the 
different philosophical systems and positions throughout history 
as reflections of the (self-) development of human reason, 
which is what the history of pure reason should be, will not 
present them as developing contingently and independently of 
one another, instead it will present them as "purposively united 
with each other as members of a whole".16 In other words, they 
will be presented as necessary stages on the way to the critical 
																																								 																				
16 Alfredo Ferrarin also notes Kant's antagonism to contingency in the history of philosophy 
(Ferrarin 2015, 77). Kant may be understood as having endorsed a weaker version of the 
position that Richard Dien Winfield refers to as "absolutist historicism", according to which 
"philosophy is historically determined, but history has an absolute development leading to an 
unconditioned standpoint from which philosophical reason can attain wisdom" (Winfield 
1987, 43). Winfield attributes this position to Hegel, the young Marx, and Georg Lukacs. I 
think that we could add Kant to this list provided we keep in mind the qualification that Kant 
identifies this standpoint not with the complete articulation of reason (unlike Hegel), but with 
a standpoint which is a presupposition for such an articulation (but which is not identical to 
it). Hence, while Surber (2003) is correct to note that Hegel's conception of the necessary 
conditions for a scientific history of philosophy is similar to Kant's, this characterization 
requires qualification.  
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philosophy; in this sense a "philosophizing history of philo-
sophy" will re-describe the empirical (or actual) history of 
philosophy in terms of Kant's account of the nature of human 
reason. In one of his notes Kant claims "there are thus three 
stages that philosophy had to go through with respect to 
metaphysics. The first was the stage of dogmatism; the second 
was that of skepticism; the third was that of the criticism of pure 
reason. This temporal order is grounded in the nature of the 
human faculty of knowledge" [my emphasis] (Kant 2002, 
337).17 We can clearly see that, for Kant, what makes this kind 
of presentation possible is precisely the fact that the different 
philosophical systems are taken to be reflections of the self-
articulation of human reason, which is an idea that one would 
expect to find in Hegel, but not in Kant.18 Yet this is exactly 
what Kant means when he describes a philosophical history of 
philosophy as a "philosophical archaeology".19 Kant held the 
view that his own system was the final product of the history of 
pure reason and as such, the critical philosophy could not have 
																																								 																				
17 Kant also mentions this three-stage characterization of the history of philosophy in the KrV 
itself (B789).  
18 Martin Bondeli (2015) has noted the strong continuity that exists between Kant's 
conception of the history of pure reason and Hegel's conception of the history of philosophy. 
This, of course, is one of the principal contentions of this paper, though there are certainly 
some important points of discontinuity. Interestingly, Bondeli also notes that Kant explicitly 
stated that the history of pure reason occupies a place in his system of reason, but he does not 
draw the connection between this claim and Kant's teleological conception of reason.  
19 While this aspect of Kant's thought has been largely neglected by Kant scholars, it is 
interesting to note that Michel Foucault claimed that he derived his concept of an 
"archaeology of the human sciences" from Kant's concept of a "philosophical archaeology" 
[philosophische Archäologie], which Foucault interprets as designating "the history of that 
which renders necessary a certain form of thought" (Foucault 1971, 60). Foucault does not 
elaborate on what he means by this gloss, but presumably he is indicating that, for Kant, a 
philosophical history of philosophy will provide an a priori narrative of the history of 
philosophy that will show that key developments in the history of philosophy were not 
contingent in character, but rather the necessary outcome of the unfolding structure of human 
reason as revealed by Kant's system; the implications of the Kantian ancestry of Foucault's 
"archaeology" to the interpretation of Foucault's work are discussed by Colin McQuillan 
(2010).  
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come about without human reason having first passed through 
the different stages that it had to pass through during its 
history.20 This development culminates in "an architectonic to 
all human knowledge, which at the present time, since so much 
material has already been collected or can be taken from the 
ruins of collapsed older edifices, would not merely be possible 
but would not even be very difficult" (B 863). This makes Kant 
different from Spinoza who, as Isaiah Berlin has noted, thought 
that the correct philosophical system could have been 
discovered at any point in time (Jahanbegloo 2000, 67). Kant 
does have a sense of history and evolution in relation to 
philosophy,21 even if he does to some extent reduce the history 
of philosophy to an a priori construction.22 
Kant speaks of systems that are "purposively united" and it is 
quite plausible to claim that Kant thought that this teleological 
account reflected the teleological nature of human reason itself. 
As we have seen above, Kant speaks of the "ends" of reason, 
and elsewhere in the KrV he speaks of the practical and 
speculative interests of reason (B 495, B 497), as well as an 
architectonic interest of reason that demands unity in relation to 
our cognitions (B 503). In fact, according to the Kant-Index, 
"Interesse" ("interest") occurs over 700 times in Kant's works, 
and many of these occurrences are connected to the concept of 
																																								 																				
20 In the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant claims "human reason in its pure 
use, as long as it lacks a critique, first tries all possible wrong ways before it succeeds in 
finding the only true way" (4:441). 
21 However, as Beiser has noted, Kant lacked Hegel's historical sense in so far as he did not 
recognize that past philosophical positions and systems should be interpreted in their 
historical contexts (Beiser 1995, xv). On the other hand, I think that Beiser is not quite correct 
when he claims that Kant had no "historical sense" whatsoever (Beiser 2011, 17).  
22 My reading of this aspect of Kant's thought corroborates Gilgen's claim that, according to 
Kant, "[his] critique needed the unsuccessful attempts, the ruins of the past, to chart its own 
course. It could not have done so in isolation" (Gilgen 2009, 169). Sebastian Gardner also 
shows sensitivity towards this aspect of Kant's thought (Gardner 1999, 209). Nonetheless, 
neither Gardner nor Gilgen recognize the importance that Kant attached to the history of pure 
reason as an account through which his system can demonstrate knowledge of the nature of 
pure reason.  
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an "Interesse der Vernunft" ("interest of reason") (Yovel 1980, 
16). Hence, we cannot brush aside Kant's talk of the interests 
(and ends) of reason as being an aberrant metaphor.23 By 
describing the relation between the different philosophical 
systems in teleological terms, Kant seems to be claiming that 
we can retrospectively narrate the history of philosophy as the 
history of various failed attempts by human reason at satisfying 
its own interests and ends.24 In the preface to the second edition 
of the KrV Kant describes the history of metaphysics in the 
following terms, "in metaphysics we have to retrace our path 
countless times, because we find that it does not lead where we 
want to go" [my emphasis] (B xv). Here, Kant is attempting to 
explain the history of metaphysics in terms of failures to satisfy 
the interests of human reason. The history of pure reason 
(which Kant never completed) will explain developments in the 
history of philosophy (especially developments in the history of 
metaphysics) in terms of the "self-development of reason", 
which is at the same time a history of human reason coming to 
know its own nature and limitations (as they have been revealed 
by the critical philosophy). Kant seems to be very close to the 
Hegelian account of the history of philosophy, which takes the 
form of oscillations between "one-sided" systems that satisfy 
some interest of human reason but only at the expense of other 
																																								 																				
23 Pauline Kleingeld (1998) provides convincing arguments for why Kant's characterization 
of reason as "conative" cannot be understood as being merely metaphorical in character, if by 
'metaphorical' we mean to refer to rhetorical devices that do not have cognitive value. Instead 
she argues that Kant's description of reason as conative should be understood as being 
symbolic (in Kant's sense of that term), i.e., as based on an analogy between reason and 
organisms, where reason is said to be related to its regulative ideas (and postulates) in the 
same way that an organism is related to that which fulfills its needs. The key point to note in 
relation to the topic of this paper is that Kant's talk of the "needs" and "interests" of reason 
plays a vital role in his presentation and characterization of reason, and it cannot be treated as 
philosophically inessential or merely decorative.		
24 In fact, in attempting to explain how philosophy could have even begun, Kant claims 
"there must have been a need of reason (theoretical or practical) which obliged it [reason] to 
ascend from its judgements about things to the grounds thereof" (Kant 2002, 417).  
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interests. Kant does not explicitly speak of "one-sidedness", but 
he does speak of "the times in which this or that alteration of 
metaphysics occurred" (B 881), and given Kant's teleological 
characterization of human reason, it is entirely plausible to think 
that Kant, had he completed the projected history of pure 
reason, would have attempted to explain these oscillations in 
terms of one-sided emphases on some interest of human reason 
at the expense of other interests.  
Otfried Höffe characterizes "the history of pure reason" as 
constituting a conclusion to Kant's teleological account of reas-
on (Höffe 1998, 636). Höffe is undoubtedly correct to empha-
size the continuity that exists between the teleological account 
of reason that is provided in the chapter on the architectonic and 
Kant's sketch of the history of pure reason. However, I would 
also add that, from Kant's point of view, the history of pure 
reason plays (or would have played had it been completed) an 
important justificatory role in Kant's philosophy because such a 
history, which would show that the history of philosophy can be 
described in terms of necessary (as opposed to contingent) 
developments, would also show that Kant's system has arrived 
at a standpoint from which the nature of human reason can be 
known, which would involve showing how the seemingly 
contingent history of philosophy actually reflects the structure 
of human reason. In other words, for Kant, a "philosophical 
history of philosophy" is an essential part of an account of the 
nature of human reason.  
 
5. Kant's metaphilosophy and 
the function of the history of pure reason 
 
n fact, in order to fully understand the metaphilosophical 
importance (for Kant) of an account of the history of pure 
reason in terms of a teleological connection of systems, we I 
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must understand Kant's conception of what philosophy is (and 
what it ought to be). In the chapter on the architectonic Kant 
claims that from the standpoint of a "cosmopolitan concept", 
"philosophy is the science of the relation of all cognition to the 
essential ends of human reason" [my emphasis] (B 867). Kant 
defines the standpoint of a cosmopolitan concept as one "that 
concerns that which necessarily interests everyone" (B 867), 
and he contrasts this standpoint with the standpoint of a 
"scholastic concept, that is sought only as a science without 
having as its end anything more than the systematic unity of this 
knowledge" (B 867). Kant champions the standpoint of a cos-
mopolitan concept and he sets out to discover "what philo-
sophy, in accordance with this cosmopolitan concept, prescribes 
for systematic unity from the standpoint of ends" [my emphasis] 
(B 868).25 Hence, I take it that it is well established that Kant 
thinks that a correct conception of human reason is a conception 
of human reason that treats it as teleological.26 The meta-
philosophical role that the history of pure reason plays (or 
would have played had it been completed) is to display how 
Kant's own system is the culmination of the "self-development 
of reason", and how it reconciles and satisfies all the interests of 
human reason that have not been satisfied by the previous 
systems of philosophy (of course, the way in which he thought 
																																								 																				
25 Kant also discusses philosophy from the standpoint of a cosmopolitan concept when he 
discusses the history of logic in the Vienna Logic: "we also have a philosophy according to a 
conceptus cosmicus, and then it is a science of the ultimate ends of human reason" (Kant 
1992, 258). In the Jäsche Logic, he defines philosophy as "the idea of a perfect wisdom, 
which shows us the final ends of reason" (Kant 1992, 537). Richard L. Velkley provides an 
extensive account of the centrality of the ends of reason (as moral ends) to Kant's philosophy. 
Velkley emphasizes that, for Kant, "philosophy, as articulated by the 'idea' of that end [the 
end of human reason], is above all else moral philosophy, or, more exactly, it is the 
unification of all uses of reason from the standpoint of moral philosophy" (Velkley 1989, 
147).  
26 We should not forget that one of the questions that Kant poses (and attempts to answer) in 
the KrV is "how do the questions that pure reason raises, and which it is driven by its own 
need to answer as well as it can, arise from the nature of universal human reason?" (B 22).  
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it did that is well beyond the scope of this paper).27 The history 
of pure reason thus serves a dual purpose. First, it demonstrates 
that Kant has made philosophy into a science in so far as it 
demonstrates that Kant has explicitly articulated "the archetype 
for the assessments of all attempts to philosophize" (B 866), 
because the possession or articulation of this archetype is a 
necessary condition for the narration of the history of pure 
reason as systematic totality28. As Kant puts it in one of his 
notes from the Lose Blätter zu den Fortschritten der Meta-
physik, "A history of philosophy is of such a special kind that in 
it, nothing of what happened can be narrated without previously 
knowing what should have happened, and hence knowing what 
can happen " (Kant 1942, 343).29 Second, it shows that the 
history of philosophy is not actually the history of contingent 
developments, "for it is not the history of opinions which arose 
accidentally here and there, but of reason developing itself by 
way of [or through] concepts" (Kant 1942, 343).30 Thus, the 
history of pure reason would show that the history of philo-
																																								 																				
27 Paula Manchester (2003) provides an interesting account of Kant's conception of 
architectonic that places Kant's idea of philosophy from a cosmopolitan point of view at its 
centre. According to Manchester, Kant's architectonic is meant to provide the tools (systems) 
by which doctrines can be interrogated both for their truth and their contribution towards the 
essential ends of human reason (Manchester 2003, 189). This interpretation coheres rather 
nicely with my interpretation of Kant's "history of pure reason" as a history that is narrated 
from the standpoint that makes it possible to identify the ends of human reason (this stand-
point being provided by Kant's system in general and, if Manchester is correct, the architec-
tonic in particular). 
28 In this connection, it is interesting to note that this is exactly how Johann Christian August 
Grohmann understood the relationship between Kant's project and the possibility of a 
scientific (in the Kantian sense) history of philosophy. Grohmann's Kantian conception of the 
history of philosophy is discussed by Valentin Pluder (2015).  
29 My translation of " Eine Geschichte der Philosophie ist von so besonder Art daß darin 
nichts von dem erzählt werden kann was geschehen ist ohne vorher zu	 wissen was hätte 
geschehen sollen mithin auch was geschehen kann" (Kant 1942, 343).  
30 My translation of "Denn es ist nicht die Geschichte der Meynung die zufällig hier order da 
aufsteigen sondern der sich aus Begriffen entwickelnden Vernunft" (Kant 1942, 343). Note 
how close this claim is to Hegel's claim that "in the history of philosophy the aim is to 
expound the self-development of reason" (Hegel 1985, 189).   
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sophy is the history of the actualization of the inherent 
potentiality of human reason, and it would re-describe the 
empirical history of philosophy using an a priori framework.31  
We should note that this last claim seems to cast doubt on 
Pauline Kleingeld's contention that "on Kant's view, it is not 
reason that develops, but rather the predispositions for the use of 
reason" (Kleingeld 1999, 62). For, in the passage that has been 
quoted above, Kant is claiming that reason itself develops.32 In 
fact, it is this very development that will, according to Kant, be 
																																								 																				
31 It is interesting to briefly compare Kant's response to the Berlin Academy's question: "what 
real progress has metaphysics made in Germany since the time of Leibniz and Wolff?" with 
Salomon Maimon's response to the same question. As I have noted above, Kant thought that 
the question had to be answered by providing a "philosophical history of philosophy" which 
would be possible a priori because "although it establishes facts of reason, it does not borrow 
them from historical narrative, but draws them from the nature of human reason, as 
philosophical archaeology" (Kant 2002, 147). Maimon's response to the question, as 
sketched out in his On the Progress of Philosophy [Ueber den Progressen der Philosophie], 
is remarkably similar to Kant's, for he takes the question to demand a "pragmatic history of 
philosophy" which "must present not the opinions of philosophers, but ways of thinking; not 
texts, but methods not unconnected ideas, but systems" and which is to be narrated a priori 
(quoted from Breazeale 2001, 692). As Daniel Breazeale notes, for Maimon, a pragmatic 
history of philosophy "represents an ideal, systematically ordered series, the precise sequence 
of which is dictated by the inner logic of the very concept of philosophy with which it 
commences" (Breazeale 2001, 692). Of course, Kant uses the term "philosophical history of 
philosophy" rather than a "pragmatic history of philosophy", but Maimon's conception of the 
kind of response that is required by the question is rather similar to Kant's in so far as both 
emphasize the a priori and systematic character of such a history. I should also note that 
Breazeale's (2001) attempt to explain the origins of Fichte's characterization of the 
transcendental philosopher as a "pragmatic historian of the human mind", which he attempts 
to do by identifying the influence of Kant's, Platner's and Maimon's use of the term "prag-
matic history" on Fichte's work, can potentially be fruitfully supplemented by paying 
attention to Kant's conception of "the history of pure reason" as a history that is narrated from 
"a transcendental point of view" and the influence that this might have had on Fichte in 
relation to his claim that transcendental philosophers are "historians" of the human mind 
(Breazeale 2001, 685).  
32 I think that Kleingeld offers an interesting defence of her interpretation in relation to Kant's 
explicitly historical writings, but in so far as she does not take into account the claims	 that	
Kant makes in relation to his conception of the history of pure reason, she does not provide 
sufficient evidence for her contention that Kant did not hold a developmental view of reason. 
In this respect, I think that Terry Pinkard's judgement that Pauline Kleingeld "has 
convincingly shown" that all attempts to claim that Kant had a historicized conception of 
reason are untenable, is hasty (Pinkard 2009, 216).  
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narrated by the history of pure reason. Furthermore, if my 
interpretation of Kant's conception of the history of pure reason 
is correct, then Karl Ameriks' claim that the dynamic language 
that Kant uses in his theoretical work (i.e., the language of 
epigenesis), has nothing to do with historical development also 
needs to be revised (Ameriks 2009, 65). Both Kleingeld and 
Ameriks are entirely correct to insist that there are crucial 
differences between Kant and his more historically inclined 
successors (especially Hegel). Nonetheless, I think that we 
should not overlook the elements of continuity that exist 
between their respective conceptions of the history of 
philosophy.33 In particular, we should not overlook the fact that 
both held the view that reason develops in history. In this sense 
my interpretation is much closer to the one advanced by 
Angelica Nuzzo. According to Nuzzo, "Kant presents pure 
reason as an edifice whose structures appear intrinsically 
historical" (Nuzzo 2006, 89). With respect to Kant, this ad-
herence to a developmental account of reason explains the 
importance of the history of pure reason in relation to Kant's 
overall project in the KrV. For if one of the main aims of the 
KrV is knowledge of reason and if reason has a history, then an 
account of the nature of reason would have to involve an 
account of its history, i.e., it would have to involve an account 
of "the history of pure reason". 
6. Concluding remarks 
efore bringing this paper to a conclusion, I would like 
to point out that Kant's conception of the history of 
philosophy was actually quite influential.34 In the 
																																								 																				
33 In this sense, I am inclined to agree with Genevieve Lloyd's claim that Kant understands 
reason "as an evolving capacity" (Lloyd 2009, 212).  
34 Park notes that "within a decade of the completion of Kant's philosophical project, there 
arose a coordinated effort among Kantian philosophers to rewrite the history of philosophy 
B 
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1790s, Kantian philosophers such as Karl Leonhard Reinhold 
(1757-1823), Karl Heinrich Heydenreich (1764-1801), Johann 
Christian August Grohmann (1769-1847), as well as Kantian 
historians of philosophy such as Dietrich Tiedemann (1748-
1803) and Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann (1761-1819), argued 
that Kant's critical philosophy had finally provided the possi-
bility for establishing a scientific history of philosophy which 
would provide a teleological account of the history of philo-
sophy, with past philosophical systems and positions being 
treated as stepping stones towards the critical philosophy (Park 
2013, 11-29).	 To take one example, Tennemann in the first 
volume of his twelve volume Geschichte der Philosophie 
(1798-1819),35 basically reproduces Kant's definition of the 
history of philosophy. He claims that the "history of philosophy 
is [an] exposition of the successive developments of philosophy 
or an exposition of the exertions of reason to realize the idea of 
the science" (quoted from Park 2013, 27). Tennemann's 
adoption of a Kantian approach to the history of philosophy 
was noted and criticized by some of his contemporaries. Hegel 
noted that on Tennemann's account, all past philosophers suffer 
from the same shortcoming in so far as they have not achieved 
the telos of the history of philosophy, i.e., the critical philosophy 
and its knowledge of the nature and limitations of human 
reason (Hegel 1985, 188). As I have argued above, this is 
exactly what one would expect from a Kantian history of pure 
reason. It is also worth noting that Reinhold's (Kantian) con-
ception of the history of philosophy directly influenced both 
Schelling and Hegel (Ameriks 2006, 194-206). Hence, we 
simply cannot understand the developments that took place in 
the historiography of philosophy during the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries without understanding Kant's con-
																																								 																																							 																																							 																	
so as to remake it into the unfolding of the Critical Philosophy" (Park 2013, 24).  Beiser has 
also noted the same development (Beiser 1995, xiv-xv).  
35 A work that Hegel describes as "famous and very frequently used" (Hegel 1985, 187).  
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ception of the history of philosophy and the influence that it had 
on his successors.  
Readers of this paper might still be puzzled by why Kant 
would think that anything important is gained by denying 
contingency in the history of philosophy, especially given the 
fact that "the history of pure reason", as I have described it 
above, is in tension with the actual-empirical history of 
philosophy. For even if the history of pure reason involves a re-
description of the empirical history of philosophy and not its 
rejection, there is still a very real danger that the complexity of 
the empirical history of philosophy will be sacrificed for the 
sake of making it congruent with the a priori framework. Given 
this danger, why did Kant think that he was justified in denying 
contingency in the history of philosophy? To give a slightly 
oversimplified answer, I think that Kant, as an Enlightenment 
philosopher, found it difficult to accept the view that the history 
of philosophy is characterized by contingency (in any way) 
because, for him, the history of philosophy had to be governed 
by rational norms.36 In short, he held a belief in the inevitability 
of progress in philosophy that is simply alien to us today.37 I 
think he would have assented to Hegel indignant protestation, 
"how should everything happening in rational affairs [i.e., 
philosophy] not itself be rational? There must from the start be a 
																																								 																				
36 For an extensive discussion of Kant's attempts to "neutralize contingency" in general see 
(Allen 2003). If my account of Kant's conception of the history of philosophy is correct, then 
it is clear that Kant would have found historical narratives that admitted contingency in the 
history of philosophy inadequate.   
37 In this respect, I think that Kant's and Hegel's histories of philosophy suffer from very 
similar problems. Beiser advances a judgement on Hegel's history of philosophy that is 
similar to the one that I am advancing on Kant's (Beiser 1995, xxix).  Michael Forster, in turn, 
refers to this conception of the history of philosophy as the "Kantian-Hegelian myth" (Forster 
2012, 868). Allen Wood, in contrast, presents an interesting defence of Kant's (and Herder's) 
belief in a progressive, teleological account of history (in general), which he describes as a 
kind of "rational faith" (Wood 2009, 335-336). While I am personally sympathetic to Wood's 
attempt to defend Enlightenment conceptions of history (in general), I have doubts about the 
possibility of providing an adequate defence of Kant's conception of the history of 
philosophy.  
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rational belief that it is not chance which rules in human affairs" 
(Hegel 1985, 23). 38 Perhaps one can attempt to interpret Kant's 
conception of the history of philosophy in a more charitable 
manner, by interpreting him as attempting to narrate the history 
of progress in philosophy, rather than the history of philosophy 
as such. However, this interpretation only pushes the problems 
that are associated with the "face-value" interpretation further 
back. For, on this interpretation, Kant's conception of the history 
of philosophy would still presuppose that the standpoint from 
which the nature of human reason can be understood has been 
attained, and that we are very close to achieving the final and 
complete philosophical system. Another way in which we can 
attempt to save Kant's conception of the history of philosophy is 
to interpret him as making regulative as opposed to constitutive 
claims. On this interpretation, his claim that the history of 
philosophy is the history of necessary progress towards the final 
philosophical system (i.e., the critical philosophy) would be 
interpreted as a regulative idea (i.e., a guiding principle that 
helps us to organize our empirical knowledge of the history of 
philosophy but one that makes no claims to truth, in the sense of 
correspondence to the actual course of the history of philo-
sophy) rather than as a constitutive claim (i.e., a claim about the 
actual course of the history of philosophy).39This interpretation, 
however, cannot amount to a defence of Kant's conception of 
the history of philosophy, because, at most, it can only plausibly 
be a defence of the viability of employing regulative ideas in 
narrating the history of philosophy, and not a defence of Kant's 
choice of a regulative idea (i.e., a teleological progression 
towards a complete philosophical system). In the final analysis, 
if I am asked to pass judgement on the prospects of a Kantian 
																																								 																				
38 Hegel uses the term 'chance'[Zufall] to describe developments that are not governed by 
rational norms.  
39 Pauline Kleingeld (2008) provides an interpretation of Kant's philosophy of history along 
these lines.   
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history of pure reason, I am compelled to turn Kant's own 
judgement against him; it "presents to my view edifices, to be 
sure, but only in ruins" (B 880).  
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